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ABSTRACT
JACKSON G. DELLINGER: The Dream of the Common Good: Not a Nightmare
(Under the direction of Dr. Steven Skultety)

This paper examines an emerging position in the philosophy of law, common-good
constitutionalism. In the first two parts of the paper, I explain the position and
constitutionalism more generally, examining how common-good constitutionalism fits within
the definition of constitutionalism providing by a neutral scholar. In the next five parts, I
attempt to show that common-good constitutionalism’s preference for explicit adherence to
the common good does not violate constitutionalism. In doing so, I provide an examination
of common-good constitutionalism’s relationship with three important constitutional
principles and the separability of common-good constitutionalism as a whole and the
infamous views of its most popular adherent. In the final part, I explore some possibilities
that this position makes available for the future.

iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I. INTRODUCTION: AN IDEA AS DANGEROUS AS THEY COME? ....................5
PART II. CONSTITUTIONALISM – WHAT IS IT? WHAT ARE ITS PRINCIPLES? ........7
PART III. THE COMMON GOOD IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR YIELDING A
CONSTITUTIONAL NIGHTMARE ......................................................................................12
PART IV. ADDRESSING WORRY #1: THE RULE OF LAW ............................................19
PART V. ADDRESSING WORRY #2: DEMOCRACY: HOW DOES IT LOOK WHEN THE
COMMON GOOD IS PRIMARY? .........................................................................................23
PART VI. ADDRESSING WORRY #3: RIGHTS: HOW DOES IT LOOK WHEN THE
COMMON GOOD IS PRIMARY? .........................................................................................25
PART VII. THE CONTROVERSY ADDRESSED ................................................................28
PART VIII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS IN A WORLD OF GOOD .....................33
BIBLIOGRAPHY ....................................................................................................................36

iv

PART I. INTRODUCTION: AN IDEA AS DANGEROUS AS THEY COME?
Recently, a debate has surfaced over a method of legal interpretation, common-good
constitutionalism, which relies on the classical legal tradition to form and interpret the
constitution and law more generally. This theory provides a method which avoids the Scylla
and Charybdis of totalitarianism, socialism and fascism, while also avoiding positivism.
The goal of common-good constitutionalism is to conceptualize the body of legal
principles as working towards a single principle, the common good, and to explicitly
interpret laws as determinations of that common good. This theory is, admittedly, quite
broad. Whereas totalitarians abuse the language of the common good, eroding important
constitutional principles, and positivists avoid the common good in legal interpretation,
common-good constitutionalism views legal interpretation as necessarily considering
relevant constitutional principles to ensure the law is indeed, as one old common-good
constitutionalist put it, “an ordinance of reason for the common good, made by him who has
care of the community, and promulgated.”1
Given the extreme generality of this theory, there are people who criticize this
alternative. Indeed, considering it rests on the application of a concept as disputed in content

1

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province,

Second and Revised (London, UK: Burnes Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1920), Ia IIae, q. 90, art 4.
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as the common good, it is understandable that critics have argued common-good
constitutionalism is a pretext for their own political nightmares. In this paper, against these
critics, I will attempt to show that common-good constitutionalism is not a mere pretext for
political evils, especially authoritarianism. Indeed, as I will argue in this thesis, commongood constitutionalism is a view which supports and explains the value of subordinate
constitutional principles such as the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Rights.
In light of such criticisms, the following sections will explain common-good
constitutionalism and address worries brought against it by legal philosophers and scholars.
Following my defense of common-good constitutionalism against worries of erosion of
constitutional principles, I will explain what I believe has caused its critics to be so troubled
by the theory. Finally, I will examine potential for a future in which common-good
constitutionalism is widely adopted as a theory with institutional legal power.

6

PART II. CONSTITUTIONALISM – WHAT IS IT? WHAT ARE ITS PRINCIPLES?
In order to assess the strengths and weaknesses of common-good constitutionalism,
we should first get clear about constitutionalism in general. After setting out the parameters
that any sort of constitutional approach would bring to legal interpretation, the specific
claims of the common-good version of constitutionalism can be assessed.
For this paper, I am adopting a stipulative sense of constitutionalism that will not, I
believe, strike readers as particularly dangerous or eccentric. I will follow the view of
constitutionalism held by a respected, widely celebrated scholar, Nicholas William Barber.
No one has attacked Barber as a totalitarian, or accused him of promoting despotism in his
scholarly assessments of constitutionalism. In Barber’s 2018 book, The Principles of
Constitutionalism, the author outlines a theory of constitutionalism that shows how a
constitution helps the state.
Barber’s account of constitutionalism specifies that the best understanding of
constitutionalism is positive. That is, his definition is in reference to the goals of the state,
rather than merely a set of restrictions on the state. Indeed, Barber notes that his positive
constitutionalism “acknowledges the need for constitutional structures to guard against
abuses of state power… but is focused on creating a strong state able to work for the good of
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its people.”2 For Barber, constitutionalism exists as a set of principles, such as the rule of
law, democracy, and rights which constitute a middle ground between the abstract moral
principles and its positive laws. A state’s abstract moral principles might include an
adherence to truth or progress, whereas its positive law would be its enacted statutes and
applicable case law. These constitutional principles are the state’s fundamental legal norms,
guiding the state in its formation of positive law.
Many of Barber’s principles can be understood in two different ways. On the one
hand, there is a thin understanding which presents a binary. For example, on this binary
understanding, the rule of law might apply in countries in which rules are written and
followed and be simply absent in countries in which this is not the case. On the other hand,
there is a thicker understanding which allows a principle to be operative to different degrees.
For instance, Barber argues that even authoritarian states such as Communist China have
applied the rule of law to some degree, as they saw its use for maintaining sovereignty. That
said, it would be ridiculous to claim, in a binary way, that Communist China correctly
embodied the rule of law. Barber argues that, when the rule of law is virtually abandoned, it
will, counterintuitively, lead to something more like chaos than total control. Whereas one
might think that the rule of law is abandoned in an attempt for autocracies to maintain order,
abandoning previously constructed codes of justice, this attempt has unexpected
consequences. Indeed, he notes that, during the Cultural Revolution, “Mao incited groups of

2

Barber, Nicholas William. The Principles of Constitutionalism. United Kingdom: Oxford University

Press, 2018, 39.
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students… to attack ‘counter-revolutionaries’, and ordered the police not to intervene in their
activities,”3 thereby virtually abandoning “the use of law as a tool for the government.”4
If the principles of constitutionalism were mere binaries which did not conflict with
one another, it might be supposed that they were all of equal worth and status. For example,
if there were an analogous set of principles of veganism, we might say that there are two
binary principles which qualify an item as acceptably vegan, that it is edible and that it
contains no animal products. Because both principles are binaries which do not preclude one
another, it might be said that there is no interplay necessary between them: it is simply
necessary that both are present rather than absent in the item.
However, if we were dealing with a set of principles for eating more generally, there
might be principles which are not binary and might preclude one another to some extent
when they applied to various degree. Indeed, if these principles included taste, nutrition, and
price, it is easy to see how they would preclude one another. For example, if the eater has the
choice between an expensive, tasty dish and a cheap, less tasty one, he must sacrifice his
adherence to one of the principles to decide which dish to eat. In this sort of case, we can see
why an eater would try to resolve the conflict by finding a necessary ordering principle
which would give the eater a guide for which of these principles to prioritize in which eating
situations.
For Barber, constitutional principles work in much the same way. The constitutional
principles he identifies are sovereignty, separation of powers, rule of law, civil society,

3

Barber, The Principles of Constitutionalism, 173.

4

Ibid.
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democracy, and subsidiarity. Understood as thin, binary concepts, they can be applied
without precluding one another in many communities. However, when such constitutional
principles are non-binary and potentially mutually exclusive, a new necessary ordering
principle would be needed to resolve conflict among them. For example, in a nation in which
slavery persists in certain regions, whereas the inhabitants of the region desire its
continuation while the overall population desires its abolition, an ordering principle would be
necessary to decide between the principles of subsidiarity and democracy.
When thick constitutional principles collide, and a new ordering principle is needed,
where shall such a principle be found? Barber’s account of constitutionalism allows for two
options: on the one hand, one of the particular principles of constitutionalism (e.g. rule of
law) could act as the ordering principle; on the other hand, there could be ordering by an
outside, non-constitutional principle that resolves the conflict among non-binary principles of
constitutionalism. Every constitutionalism must accept one of these two options, if conflict
among the principles is to be resolved in a principled manner.
Of course, if we turn to an outside principle, it is of the highest importance that this
principle be appropriate and adequate for the constitutional task. For example, if one were to
choose the non-constitutional principle of maximizing population, there could be great
erosion of the rule of law or other central constitutional principles in favor of decisions which
allow for greater population growth. Moreover, because this ordering principle has no clear
relation to the constitutional principles themselves, it would likely be a poor guide to
decision making regarding which principles to prioritize over others. This example illustrates
two requirements for such an outside guiding principle: [1] the principle must be able to be
plausibly applied without conflicting substantially with the constitutional principles
10

themselves, and [2] it must also be related to the principles in such a way that it could
plausibly be used for decision making concerning prioritization of the principles.
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PART III. THE COMMON GOOD IS NOT SUFFICIENT FOR YIELDING A
CONSTITUTIONAL NIGHTMARE
Having set out a brief account of constitutionalism, we can better appreciate the
theoretical position being advocated by common-good constitutionalists. They are
constitutionalists who offer the notion of the common-good as the outside ordering principle
for the principles of constitutionalism. Indeed, in his article for The Atlantic, “Beyond
Originalism,” perhaps the most prominent defender of common-good constitutionalism,
Harvard law professor Adrian Vermeule, adopts this approach by stating that a commongood constitutionalist outlook would be “based on the principles that government helps direct
persons, associations, and society generally toward the common good, and that strong rule in
the interest of attaining the common good is entirely legitimate.”5 Can the common-good
meet the two requirements for an outside ordering principle that we identified above?
In the next sections of my thesis, I’ll address [1] whether this principle conflicts with
the constitutional principles it would be ordering. In this section I’ll address a prominent
worry concerning [2] the second criteria. Some believe that the common good cannot guide
prioritization of the various principles, and that it is not appropriate for governance in
general. Such critics believe that the “common good” is little more than a rhetorical cover for
totalitarian regimes, and that any political or legal theory that deploys the “common good” as

5

Adrian Vermeule, “Beyond Originalism,” The Atlantic (Atlantic Media Company, March 31, 2020),

https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/common-good-constitutionalism/609037/.
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an organizing principle is a recipe for tyranny. One such critic is legal scholar Garrett Epps,
who, in his article “Common-Good Constitutionalism is an Idea as Dangerous as They
Come,” compares Vermeule’s constitutional preference for the common good to the
authoritarian regime of Franisco Franco.6
This objection has some truth to it: the common good is, indeed, a very general goal
and we can imagine it being deployed by aspiring despots. Indeed, the abstract notion of a
common good is so general that some might accuse it of being without any useful content at
all. However, as the example of maximizing population suggests, this generality is a potential
benefit. If the principle were too simple or specific, it would not be successful in capturing
the enormous amount of political and ethical complexity which are needed for an
organizational principle of this level of authority and generality. That said, if the notion of
the common good is to be supported, it needs to be given some specific content and definite
meaning. To this end, it will be helpful to look at some examples in the history of political
thought of conceptions of the common good.
One potential view is that of the American founders, who certainly incorporated the
language of the common good into their various letters and declarations. In John Adams’s
draft for the Constitution of Massachusetts, he wrote that “[g]overnment is instituted for the
common good,”7 which he identifies with “the protection, safety, prosperity, and happiness

6

Garrett Epps, “Common-Good Constitutionalism Is an Idea as Dangerous as They Come,” The Atlantic (Atlantic
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constitutionalism-dangerous-idea/609385/.
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John Adams, “Constitution of Massachusetts,” Constitution of Massachusetts, 1780 (National Humanities
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of the people.”8 He opposes the common good and its categories with what might be termed
private goods, or “the profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class of
men.”9 This Constitution, indeed this specific article, is still the highest state law in
Massachusetts.
This understanding of the common good, harkening back to the republicanism of
Machiavelli, has some distinct features. First, this version of the common good is used
explicitly to support a democratic view of government, as the article states immediately
following the defense of the common good as the purpose of government, “therefore the
people alone have an incontestable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute
government, and to reform, alter, or totally change the same when [the subcategories of the
common good] require it.”10 Furthermore, on this understanding of the common good, the
principle constitutes the personal wellbeing of the people, wherein the people refers to the
entire group of citizens rather than one person or class. In this sense, this understanding of
the common good is democratic and egalitarian.
Of course, this example should not be taken to be representative of the American
founders as a whole. The founders were individuals with differing beliefs, and an
examination of their agreement regarding the nature of the common good is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, it should be noted that positive references to the common good or

8

Adams, “Constitution of Massachusetts,” Art. VII.

9

Ibid.
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public good are numerous among some of the most prominent founders, including Thomas
Jefferson11, Alexander Hamilton12, and James Madison13.
Likewise, there are progressive accounts of the common good. Rachael Walsh from
the University of Dublin has outlined how the common good informs the progressive view of
property rights. In doing so, Walsh draws from the classical tradition, recounting the various
ways Thomas Aquinas’s views on property contribute to the progressive view that private
property can be justified only after the needs of all individuals have been met. Specifically,
Walsh draws from Professor John Finnis’s understanding of Aquinas as supporting property
rights “based on the contribution private property can make to the common good, as opposed
to any metaphysical connection between the possessor and the property.”14
Indeed, there is a classical understanding of the common good as well. The classical
view features the beliefs of Aristotle, Plato, and the natural law tradition and renders the
common good as “that members have in taking part in a complex activity that involves all or

11

Thomas Jefferson, “First Inaugural Address,” Princeton University (The Trustees of Princeton University,

2006), https://jeffersonpapers.princeton.edu/selected-documents/first-inaugural-address-0.
12

Alexander Hamilton, “Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History: Federalist Nos. 21-30,”

Research Guides (Library of Congress), accessed January 29, 2022, https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text21-30#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493335, Federalist No. 22, 27, 30.
13

James Madison, “Federalist Papers: Primary Documents in American History: Federalist Nos. 1-10,” Research

Guides (Library of Congress), accessed January 29, 2022, https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lgbox-wrapper-25493273, Federalist No. 10.
14

Walsh, Rachael. “Property, Human Flourishing and St. Thomas Aquinas: Assessing a Contemporary Revival.”

Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence 31, no. 1 (n.d.): 197–222. doi:10.1017/CJLJ.2018.9, 5.
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most members of the community.”15 Even within this classical view, there are different
schools and individual accounts of the common good. For example, the extent to which
private property serves the common good would receive a different answer from Plato and
Aristotle. In Plato’s ideal Republic, the city’s guardians hold most of the property as a form
of public control of resources, whereas Aristotle prefers private ownership with expectations
placed upon individuals to uphold the common good.16
While brief, this historical survey shows that the concept of the common good can be
given definite meaning, and it shows that different schools of thought have offered different
accounts of the common good. However, this malleability should not be taken to imply
uselessness. The fact that this concept is difficult to define perfectly, and the fact that it has
been understood in different ways by competing interpretive schools, does not suggest it is
philosophically worthless. Indeed, the opposite is the case: it shows many profound thinkers
have looked to this notion as capturing deep truths about the human political experience. In
this way, the common good is like the concepts of justice, liberty, and equality. We do not
dismiss these concepts because they are understood in different ways by different thinkers.
Instead, we take that as evidence that they provide insight into some necessary aspect of
political life.
This brief survey also gives us reason to doubt that, when the common good is given
specific meaning, that meaning is necessarily despotic. As I acknowledged earlier, a tyrant
could take this concept and interpret it in a way that suits his anti-constitutional goals. But

15

Hussain, Waheed, "The Common Good", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 Edition),

Edward N. Zalta (ed.), https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/common-good/, Section 5.
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Hussain, Waheed, "The Common Good", Section 9.
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it’s just as clear that the common good has served as a useful guide for many political bodies
which would likely not be considered tyrannies, and certainly not totalitarian states. Indeed,
the Supreme Court of the United States ruled in Jacobson v. Massachusetts (1905) that there
exist “manifold restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common
good.”17 The Court went further, arguing that “organized society could not exist with safety
to its members”18 on any other basis. Other polities have even included language supporting
the common good in their most fundamental legal documents. For example, the German
Basic Law states that the use of property “shall also serve the public good.”19 Likewise, the
Constitution of Ireland states in its preamble that the purpose of adopting the constitution is
to seek “promot[ion] [of] the common good.”20 Elsewhere, the Constitution defines the state
as a guardian of the common good and notes the central importance of the common good in
establishing rights of regulation by the state.
In short, it is clear that the common good has many different interpretations and
schools of through surrounding its content and application. However, this does not preclude
the possibility of its use as an organizational principle for government, as is evident from
examples from the highest authorities in both the United States and Europe. Therefore, those
who argue that the notion of the common good cannot be an appropriate ordering principle of

17

Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905), 197.
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Ibid.

19

“Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany,” Federal Ministry of Justice (Federal Office of Justice,

September 2020), https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html.
20

Constitution of Ireland, gov.ie (Republic of Ireland, 2018), https://www.gov.ie/en/publication/d5bd8c-

constitution-of-ireland/.

17

constitutional principles, or who argue that it is impossible for the common good to provide
guidance for resolving conflicts among constitutional principles, are wrong.
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PART IV. ADDRESSING WORRY #1: THE RULE OF LAW
Having addressed the general worry that the notion of the common good is simply not
suited for playing a constitutional role, I will now deal with more focused arguments that
claim that common good constitutionalism threatens the specific constitutional principles of
the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Rights.
Legal philosophers Leonid Sirota and Mark Mancini, in their blogpost “Interpretation
and the Value of Law,” argue that common good constitutionalism would violate the rule of
law because it introduces substantive extra-legal content into the law.21 For Sirota and
Mancini, common-good constitutionalists violate the necessary objective neutrality of judges
because they “look to extraneous moral and policy commitments as guides for legal
interpretation, disregarding the law’s role as the authoritative record of the settlement of
disagreement and point of reference for citizens whose views of what is good and just differ,
seeking to impose pre-ordained results regardless of whether they are consistent with what
the law actually is.”22
However, this argument is both question-begging and self-defeating. As authors
Stéphane Sérafin, Kerry Sun, and Xavier Foccroulle Ménard, in their article “The Common
Good in Legal Interpretation: A Response to Leonid Sirota and Mark Mancini,” argue, it is

21

Leonid Sirota and Mark Mancini, “Interpretation and the Value of Law,” Double Aspect, February 22, 2021,

https://doubleaspect.blog/2021/02/22/interpretation-and-the-value-of-law/.
22

Sirota and Mancini, “Interpretation and the Value of Law,” paragraph 12.
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question begging to presume that the natural law is outside of the realm of law.23 For
adherents of natural law theory, like Vermeule and other natural law common-good
constitutionalists, “[natural law] principles are every bit a part of the law, just as much as any
legal text, rule or doctrine.”24 That is to say, Sirota and Mancini argue that natural law
theorists import extra-textual content into the law, and therefore import important extra-legal
content into the law, but they are assuming, against the natural law theorists, the very point of
dispute, that there is law beyond the mere text. It is self-defeating because even positivists
like Sirota and Mancini utilize content outside the letter of the law: these critics themselves
define law as an aid to “social cohesion” rather than defining law as acts of the sovereign,
and so they themselves appeal to extra-legal standards for something to be law.25 In much
the same way, originalists, including common-good originalists like Josh Hammer, look
towards other texts from the period of legislation such as preambles or dictionaries which
they utilize to interpret the law.
Besides rebutting the specific criticism of Sirota and Mancini, I think a positive
argument can be made that the principles of the common good and the rule of law support
one another, rather than conflict with one another. Barber makes a distinction between

23

Stéphane Sérafin, Kerry Sun, and Xavier Foccroulle Ménard, “The Common Good in Legal Interpretation: A
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minimal rule of law and maximal (unachievable) rule of law. Rather than be in tension with
the rule of law, the common good (which itself may never be fully achieved) helps us to
deploy the rule of the law in a way that allows it to be the most effective and coherent given
other principles. Sometimes, the common good may promote minimal rule of law, other
times it may promote maximal rule of law, and still other times it may recommend something
between these extremes. The common good presents a coherent goal for which the law can
be promulgated, just as social utility acts as a goal for other legal theorists like Sirota and
Mancini.26
Moreover, because the common good acts as an exterior or transcendent organizing
principle, rather than as one more constitutional principle among many, its dictates may
include the prioritization of different constitutional principles in different situations. For
example, the principles of subsidiarity and the separation of powers allow methods for
navigating the intricacies of the rule of law. Both principles provide substantive devotions to
epistemic humility for particular offices, recognizing their particular place in promotion of
the common good, which is not unlimited.
Therefore, given these two essential principles, common-good constitutionalists need
not endorse judicial reversal of positive law in favor of the natural law. Vermeule in
particular favors a model of courts in which judges defer to the legislature’s interpretation of
how positive laws are derived from the common good, noting the possible origin of such
deference in the classical legal principle of determination.27 Indeed, Vermeule specifically

26

Sérafin, Sun, and Ménard, “The Common Good in Legal Interpretation: A Response to Leonid Sirota and Mark
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emphasizes throughout his new book, Common Good Constitutionalism, released during the
drafting stages of this paper, that “courts need not be the institutions charged with directly
identifying or specifying the common good.”28

28

Vermeule, Common Good Constitutionalism, 25.
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PART V. ADDRESSING WORRY #2: DEMOCRACY: HOW DOES IT LOOK WHEN
THE COMMON GOOD IS PRIMARY?
As noted earlier, legal scholar Garrett Epps argues that common-good
constitutionalism threatens democracy by encouraging authoritarianism. The evidence he and
others provide for this argument is that multiple authoritarian regimes have utilized the
language of the common good in their edicts, or even in their constitutions, despite the clear
injustice of their regimes.
As we saw in the last section, it is true that common-good constitutionalism does not
absolutize any individual constitutional principle and apply it in the same manner and
intensity to differing polities: different levels of each principle are recommended insofar as
they serve the common good. In the same way, the level of democracy which best serves the
common good in a particular society is the level of democracy that this society should have,
and this will differ between societies.
This is clearly true across societies which are different in kind, e.g., between the
family and the state, but it can also occur between individual societies of the same kind, e.g.,
different nations. For example, some countries might have strong referendum cultures,
furthering the common good by direct democratic actions. Others might better serve the
common good by appealing mostly to democratically elected legislators. This may also not
be a question of how much but of what kind of democracy best serves a society. For instance,

23

the common good of some societies might be better served by utilizing democratic methods
such as sortition to select legislative bodies, such as town councils, than by direct election.
However, this recognition of the variability to which democracy serves the common
good across societies does not imply that whatever level of democracy exists in a given
society is the legitimate or correct amount for that society. Some levels of democracy, such
as totalitarianism or total direct democracy, may be necessarily opposed to the common
good. An objector might argue that the possibility of this recognition is not enough: a lack of
democracy must be excluded by common-good constitutionalism’s very nature. However,
there are a couple problems with this objection. First, it is unreasonable to contend that even
appalling political scenarios must be inherently precluded by a general theory or position.
One might describe themselves as an adherent of democratic theory, even though being a
democrat might not inherently preclude dangerous majoritarianism. There is no reason to
conclude a common-good constitutionalist must view all other broad adherents of commongood constitutionalism as reasonable allies. Second, without the recognition that a lack or
excess of democracy would be deleterious to the common good, the argument against these
political situations is weaker, a mere violation of procedure or theoretical boundary rather
than a total breakdown of society.
Finally, even though some authoritarian societies utilize the language of
constitutional principles, such as democracy, this does not mean that these concepts
encourage authoritarianism. Rather, it means evil regimes distort these concepts. The
common good is no different.

24

PART VI. ADDRESSING WORRY #3: RIGHTS: HOW DOES IT LOOK WHEN THE
COMMON GOOD IS PRIMARY?
In a complete reversal from the previous worry, some legal scholars, such as Randy
Barnett, believe that common-good constitutionalism, rather than eroding democracy, will
necessitate a rampant majoritarianism that crushes individual rights. In his article, “CommonGood Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any Non-originalist Approach to the
Constitution,” Barnett even implies that, under Vermeule’s system, segregation could not
have been eliminated.29 He bases this on Vermeule’s adherence to Thayerian deference, or
the doctrine that the courts should generally defer to the legislature in legal interpretation.
There is some weight to Barnett’s objection. Vermeule, against the professed views of
political liberals, believes that it is imperative to “legislate morality.”30 However, this does
not necessitate majoritarianism in the way Barnett believes. Indeed, Vermeule explicitly
rejects this interpretation, insisting that the classical legal tradition he favors includes the
notion of rights, though they are not constructed in an “essentially individualist, autonomybased, and libertarian fashion,” as are rights under modern progressivism or libertarianism.31

29
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Vermeule is not alone: while many common-good constitutionalists posit different
sorts of relationships between rights and the common good, none of them maintain that rights
play no positive role in common-good constitutionalism. A brief survey of recent theories
shows this quite clearly.
One possibility is that rights are an inherent part of the common good: a participation
in these rights (or the legal system of rights) is a participation in the common good itself. On
this theory, participation in a legal system oriented to the common good, as it is universally
accessible and not diminished by participation, is a common good. This is the position of the
common-good constitutionalist Michael Foran, a Lecturer in Public Law at the University of
Strathclyde, which he argues for in his piece, “Rights and the Common Good.”32
Conversely, another theory among common-good constitutionalists is that rights are
merely instrumental for achieving the common good (or are predications of the common
good), and, in the end, they are only private goods, even if they are universal. That is, rights
may be universal goods in that they are accessible to everyone and are not diminished by
their use, but they are not shared between individuals. This is the position of common-good
constitutionalist Jamie McGowan, a Ph.D. Candidate at the University of Glasgow, expressed
in his reply to Foran, “On the Tyranny of Rights.”33
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Of course, these different common-good constitutionalists may disagree with one
another about the content of rights, but such disagreement isn’t a problem for common-good
constitutionalism since it is found in every type of political philosophy. Take, for example,
political liberals. Their disagreements over rights to freedom of movement, healthcare,
ownership of weaponry, and drug use provide only a few of a plethora of examples.
Moreover, such disagreement about the content of rights among common-good
constitutionalists does not imply that there is no content upon which they agree. Indeed,
Vermeule contends in Common Good Constitutionalism that legally recognized rights such
as the right to liberty of speech developed as legislative agreement upon the understanding
that certain rights, such as liberty of expression, contributed to the common good.34
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PART VII. THE CONTROVERSY ADDRESSED
Thus far, I have presented an argument that common-good constitutionalism fits
within a non-totalitarian conception of constitutionalism, showing why the objections
presented towards common-good constitutionalism fail to prove that common-good
constitutionalism is necessarily totalitarian. In brief, I have argued that merely accepting the
common-good as an ordering principle does not necessitate the demise of constitutionalism,
and I’ve also show that common-good constitutionalism does not erodes the three major
constitutional principles of the Rule of Law, Democracy, and Rights. Those who believe that
the common-good, and common-good constitutional are threats to these values, tend to
misunderstand common-good constitutionalism’s essence and goals. As a result, they often
tend to provide criticism that isn’t particularly substantive or useful because they are arguing
against a false view of their target.
However, if common-good constitutionalism is as benign as I have described it, and if
supporting the principles of common-good constitutionalism is no more threatening than
supporting common practice in the historical United States and contemporary liberal
democracies such as Ireland, the reader might be perplexed. If common-good
constitutionalism is quite harmless, why would it elicit so much ferocious criticism from so
many critics? The reader might suspect that there is more to the story than I have been
admitting.

28

To be candid, there is some truth to this worry. The criticisms of common-good
constitutionalism have generally been directed towards Adrian Vermeule, who wrote the
article that was, in many ways, the genesis of the contemporary discussion surrounding the
view. This regular connection between Professor Vermeule, on the one hand, and commongood constitutionalism as a theory, on the other, has caused considerable harm and confusion
in two important ways.
First, it is important to note that Vermeule’s initial article was incredibly incendiary
in tone. Vermeule opens his essay by claiming originalism is a “faith” which has been pushed
onto conservatives as “all but mandatory.”35 Furthermore, he denigrates the conservative
legal institution the Federalist Society for “talk[ing] and think[ing] of little else”36 besides
originalism. Moreover, Vermeule is dismissive of his intellectual opponents throughout the
article. For example, he states plainly that originalism “has now outlived its utility, and has
become an obstacle”37 to the conservative legal movement. He further describes his various
opponents as “enslaved to the original meaning,”38 adopting “incoherent goal[s],”39 and
“often plac[ing] their own satisfactions (financial and sexual) and the good of their class or
social milieu above the common good.”40 It should come as no surprise that this incendiary
dismissiveness has incited criticism that deploys the same tone. The impassioned arguments
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for the authoritarianism and banality of common-good constitutionalism offered by Barnett
and Epps, I suspect, are at least partially explained by none other than wounded pride.
However, this attempt at explanation should not be taken as an indictment of
Vermeule’s critics as merely overly sensitive interlocutors. For there are substantive
positions taken by Vermeule that are genuinely unpopular, to say the least, especially among
liberal conservatives. In the Atlantic essay, for example, Vermeule announces his firm
support for the administrative state, or “a powerful presidency ruling over a powerful
bureaucracy,”41 the latter of which should “be seen not as an enemy, but as the strong hand of
legitimate rule.”42 Another controversial position he takes in this article is that constitutional
law should feature a broad state authority to protect society from “biological, social, and
economic” scourges, prompting Vermeule to spitefully and gleefully dismiss the downfall of
libertarian conceptions of rights to free speech and property, which must “fall under the
ax.”43
Perhaps none of these positions are as controversial, however, as a position for which
Vermeule has argued outside of the Atlantic. As Barnett points out in his critical response to
“Beyond Originalism,” Professor Vermeule is a Catholic integralist.44 That is, he holds the
position outlined by Pater Edmund Waldstein, O. Cist. that “the temporal power must be

41

Vermeule, “Beyond Originalism,” paragraph 18.

42

Ibid.

43

Ibid, paragraph 17.

44

Randy E Barnett, “Common-Good Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any Non-Originalist Approach

to the Constitution,” paragraph 13.

30

subordinated to the spiritual power.”45 In other words, Vermeule believes that, on matters
which pertain to faith, the Roman Catholic Church should, ideally, have power over the state.
To say that such a position is merely unpopular would, of course, be an understatement.
Indeed, Pew Research has indicated that, in 2021, only 19 percent of Americans support the
federal government ending their enforcement of the separation of church and state, and a
measly 15 percent support the federal government declaring the United States a Christian
nation.46 This is not even to mention the potential disputes over which Christian church, if
any, would act as the authority on matters of faith. Given his adherence to this controversial
doctrine, it is not difficult to imagine why Vermeule’s opponents might brand him as a
reactionary authoritarian, and then also worry that it affects common-good constitutionalists
more generally.
But this sort of worry, it seems to me, is not well founded. It’s true that any
discussion of Vermeule’s thought will probably need to say something about integralism.
But there’s no reason to think that every discussion of common-good constitutionalism needs
to be grounded in Vermeule’s ideas. Indeed, Vermeule himself distinguishes the two. In his
recent book, the professor states that his belief that “[the United States’] executive-centered
order can be ordered to the common good”47 is a “particular interpretation… separable from
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the general claims about the nature of constitutionalism also offered”48 in the book. Indeed,
the complaint that some critics make, that a constitutionalism based merely in the common
good is too general, acts here as a good line of defense. There is no reason to think that a
common-good constitutionalist’s views about the common good, empirical or definitional,
must cohere with Vermeule’s any more than a political liberal’s views about liberty must
cohere with those of John Locke or John Rawls or John Stuart Mill.
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PART VIII. OPPORTUNITIES FOR PROGRESS IN A WORLD OF GOOD
Importantly, a common-good constitutionalist understanding of rights provides ample
space for dialogue between the left and right over new possibilities of agreement. For
instance, if common-good constitutionalists of the right consider the flourishing of family life
to be an important step to achieving the common good, perhaps they could be convinced of
the good of rights to a just wage, family stipends, or family healthcare plans. Likewise,
especially natural law common-good constitutionalists might be inclined to accept more
typically cosmopolitan human rights accepted by the left.
Conversely, more progressive common-good constitutionalists might be more
inclined to accept rights of the family, rights to freedom of conscience, and rights to freedom
of worship. Perhaps more centrally, progressives might be inclined to accept more
conservative duties to society over individual claims to liberty.
If common-good constitutionalism were to be adopted, some constitutional orders
would change more drastically than others. Imagining what developments would be made in
particular polities upon adoption of common-good constitutionalism is difficult, as the
common good inherently depends on the needs of each particular polity in each particular
political, social, and economic situation. However, broad generalizations about the effects of
common-good constitutionalism’s replacement of positivist theories of law may be made.
In the Republic of Ireland, for example, the supreme court has already decided that
both the common good and the natural law are elements of the law proper. O’Donnell v.
33

South Dublin County Council49, in particular, found that it was the right of a family of
Travellers, an Irish minority ethnic group, to have the state provide for them ample access to
basic sanitation facilities. Likewise, Ireland’s High Court decision in Fleming v.
Ireland50 rejected arguments that interpreted the constitution’s guarantee to a right to life as a
right to suicide or voluntary euthanasia.
In the United States, changes would be more drastic. Take, for example, the recent
Mississippi Supreme Court decision, Butler v. State of Mississippi51, in which the Court
overturned the decision of the people on behalf of the legislature on a mere technicality, with
no consideration of the common good or constitutional principles which guided the
legislature’s promulgation of the law. I imagine a court more devoted to the common good
would have avoided such a decision, given the judges’ lack of consideration for the
intentions of the legislature in supporting the common good in the decision of the court.
This world would be especially helpful to legal conservatives. Although the case
Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health52 has yet to be decided as of the drafting of this thesis, it
seems unlikely to result in a national ban of abortion on constitutional principles. Instead, the
best conservatives can hope for is an overturn of Roe. If there were six conservative
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common-good constitutionalists on the Court, rather than six more-or-less-devoted
originalists, I somehow doubt that would be the case.
In conclusion, I have presented the case that the standard arguments directed against
common-good constitutionalism rely upon misunderstandings of common-good
constitutionalism or double standards with regards to other political and legal views.
Common-good constitutionalism is not a totalitarian view but rather a possible interpretation
of constitutionalism given a stipulative view of constitutionalism I have taken from the
thought of respected legal scholar N. W. Barber. Furthermore, common-good
constitutionalism offers an interesting solution to the problem of how to make decisions
given a variety of potentially conflicting constitutional principles.
Against the claims of critics, I have shown that common-good constitutionalism does
not conflict with respect for three fundamental constitutional principles, the Rule of Law,
Democracy, and Rights. Though these critics may have substantive arguments against the
views of Adrian Vermeule, the leading proponent of common-good constitutionalism, they
unnecessarily conflate this individual’s positions with common-good constitutionalism more
generally.
Indeed, I have argued that common-good constitutionalism is not a nightmare to be
feared but a dream to be realized. Specifically, I have illuminated ways in which adoption of
this view might provide ground for compromise between legal progressives and
conservatives and attempted to provide some predictions about what changes would occur in
the legal system given an adoption of common-good constitutionalism over positivism.
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